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Recent Decisions
AmmITRATIV LAw- APPLICATIOr OF FEDERAL ADmINSTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT To HEARmGS IN DEPORTATION CASES
Plaintiff, a native and citizen of China, was arrested on a
charge of being unlawfully in the United States through having
overstayed shore leave. A hearing was held before an immigra-
tion inspector who recommended deportation. This was approved
by the Acting Commissioner and affirmed by the Board of Immi-
gration appeals. Plaintiff sought release by habeas corpus on ground
that the hearing was not in conformity with the requirements of
the Administrative Procedure Act of June 11, 1946, 60 STAT. 237,
5 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. Held, reversing the District Court for the
District of Columbia and the Court of Appeals, writ sustained.
Deportation proceedings must conform to the requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act if resulting orders are to have valid-
ity. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33 (1950).
Plaintiff relied on Section 5 of the APA, which provides, "In
every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined
on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing,... (c) ...
No officer, employee or agent engaged in the performance of in-
vestigative or prosecuting functions for an agency in any case
shall, in that or in factually related cases, participate or advise
in the decision ....." 60 STAT. 237, 240, 5 U. S. C. § 1004 (c), and
§ 11, 60 STAT. at 237,244, 5 U.S.C. § 1010, which provides for the
appointment of examiners.
The Government admitted noncompliance, but asserted, first,
that Section 19 (a) of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917,
39 STAT. 874, 889, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 155 (a) - which author-
izes deportation - does not expressly require a hearing, and
therefore deportation proceedings are not an "adjudication re-
quired by statute" under Section 5; and, second, even if they
are, Section 7 (a), "...but nothing in this Act shall be deemed
to supersede the conduct of a specified classes of proceedings in
whole or part by or before boards or other officers specially pro-
vided for by or designated pursuant to statute...." 60 STAT. 237,
241, 5 U.S.C. § 1006, excludes such proceedings from the require-
ments of the Act. This argument is based on the assertion that
immigrant inspectors are "specially provided for by or designated
pursuant to" Section 16 of the Immigration Act, which provides,
"...and the examination of aliens arrested within the United States
under this Act, shall be conducted by immigrant inspectors, ex-
cept as hereinafter provided in regard to boards of special in-
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quiry... " 39 STAT. 874, 885, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 152.
The court, in holding that this was an instance of "adjudication
required by statute," pointed out that without a hearing there
would be no constitutional authority for deportation. An admin-
istrative officer, when executing the provisions of a statute in-
volving the liberty of persons, may not disregard the fundamental
principles of due process of law as understood at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution. The Japanese Immigrant Case,
189 U.S. 86, 100, 101 (1903); Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S.
454, 459 (1920); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 160 (1945) (con-
curring opinion). The constitutional requirement of procedural
due process of law permeates every valid enactment of Congress.
The limitation to hearings in Section 5 exempts only those hear-
ings which administrative agencies may hold by regulation, rule,
custom, or special dispensation; not those held by compulsion.
The limiting words exempt hearings of less than statutory author-
ity, not those of more than statutory authority.
In determining the second question, that of whether Sec-
tion 7(a) excludes deportation hearings, the court stated that
nothing in the Immigration Act specially provides that inspectors
shall conduct deportation hearings or be designated to do so. The
language directs them to conduct border inspection and author-
izes functions which are indispensible to investigations and in
preparation of complaints for prosecutive purposes. If hearings
are to be had before employees whose responsibility and author-
ity derives from a lesser source - than those whose responsi-
bilities and duties as hearing officers are established by other
statutory provision - then they must be examiners whose inde-
pendence and tenure are so guarded by the Act as to give the
assurances of neutrality which Congress thought would guarantee
the impartiality of the administrative process. Mr. Justice Reed,
dissenting, found it obvious that the exception in Section 7(a),
of the APA covers immigration inspectors dealing with the ar-
rest of an alien for violation of the Immigration Act.
Thus the Court, in its first interpretation of the many prob-
lems raised by the Hearings section of the APA, has resolved
a lower court conflict in favor of the minority. See Orlow, Habeas
Corpses In Immigration Cases, 10 OHO ST. L. J. 319, 62 HAav. L.
REV. 1060 (1949).
The case which caused the greatest disturbance to the Immi-
gration Service was Eisler v. Clark, 77 F. Supp. 610 (D. C. 1948),
cert. denied stub nora. Potash v. Clark, 338 U. S. 879 (1949).
There, in holding the APA applicable to deportation proceedings,
the decision was based entirely on Section 5, that a hearing is an
integral part of the Deportation Act, and no mention was made
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of the exception, "specially provided for by or designated pur-
suant to statute," in Section 7 (a).
The problem of applicability of the APA to the Immigration
Act also has become significant in determining what form of judi-
cial review is available in immigration matters. Orlow, supra, 328-
334. Section 10 makes available any applicable form of legal action,
"Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2)
agency action is by law committed to agency discretion...". The
question has been whether the Immigration Act, 39 STAT. 890
(1917), 8 U.S.C. § 155 (1946)," . . . the decision of the Attorney
General shall be final...," precluded judicial review. Cases which
have held the APA Section 10 not applicable are: Prince v. Com-
missioner of Immigration and Naturalization, 87 F. Supp. 53 (N. D.
Ohio 1949); Valenti v. Clark, 83 F. Supp. 167 (D. C. 1949) and
Yiakoumis v. Hall, supra. Other cases have allowed judicial re-
view under the APA on the ground that the due process concept
has always made habeas corpus available to those adversely af-
fected by deportation orders. These cases include United States
ex rel. Carnaratta v. Miller, 79 F. Supp. 643 (S. D. N. Y. 1948);
United States ex rel. Trinler v. Caruse, 166 F. 2d 458 (3d Cir.
1948); United States ex rel. Lindenau v. Watkins, 73 F. Supp.
216 (S. D. N. Y. 1947), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United
States ex rel. Poetau v. Watkins, 164 F. 2d 457 (2d Cir. 1947).
In view of the court's argument in the principal case- quali-
fying the Immigration Act with the judge-made requirements of
a hearing, so as to bring the Act within the APA- it would seem
that the same argument applies to the judge-made requirement
of review, thus bringing the Act within Section 10 of the APA,
on the ground that the Attorney General's decision is not final
within the exception in Section 10.
A similar problem as that in the principal case has been
raised in connection with the mail fraud order statutes. 39 U.S.C. §§
259, 732 (1946). Bersoff v. Donaldson, 174 F. 2d. 494 (D. C. Cir.
1949), held that since the fraud order statutes do not in terms
require a hearing, Sections 5 and 8 (b) of the APA are inappli-
cable. Here the Postmaster General issued a fraud order after a
hearing before a trial examiner, and plaintiffs sought to enjoin
enforcement of the order alleging that they could not file ex-
ceptions to the recommended decision of the examiner, as pro-
vided by Section 8 (b) of the APA. The case is discussed in 62
HAuv. L. REv. 1060 (1949). In this field courts, without directly
holding, have indicated a hearing would be required. Pike v.
Walker, 121 F. 2d 37, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
625 (1941); Donnell Mfg. Co. v. Wyman, 156 Fed. 415, 416 (C. C.
E. D. Mo. 1907). Cf. Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F. 2d 511 (D. C. Cir.
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1945). It would seem that here, as in the principal case, "the con-
stitutional requirement of procedural due process" would per-
meate the fraud order statutes, thus making them an instance of
"adjudication required by statute," and thereby bringing them
within the requirements of the APA.
The present APA was introduced in 1945. S. 7, H.R. 1203,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. It is largely a compromise between the two
reports of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure, which was named by presidential direction in 1939.
The Act adopted the recommendations of the majority, rather than
the more thoroughgoing separation of agency functions recommend-
ed by the minority. See S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 55-60
(1941). One purpose of the Act was to secure a greater uniform-
ity of procedure and standardization of administrative practice.
McFARLAND, ANALYSIs OF THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATVE PROCEDURE
ACT, FEDERAL ADiINISTATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AD THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE AGENCIES 16, 22 (N.Y.U. 1947). More fundamental, how-
ever, was the problem of the commingling of functions, and the
desire to separate the prosecution, investigation, and adjudication
functions as pointed out above. See Sung, supra, 450. For argu-
ments both for and against such separation see, CARROW, BACK-
GROUND OF ADMINISTRATnm LAW 95. It is with these considera-
tions in mind that one should approach the instant decision.
As the court pointed out, the legislative history of the Act is
very conflicting. However, the exception in Section 5 was meant
to exclude " . . . the great mass of administrative routine as well
as pensions, claims, and a variety of similar matters in which
Congress has usually intentionally or traditionally refrained from
requiring an administrative hearing." S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess. 22 (1946). Deportation hearings traditionally have been
required by the Immigration Act as interpreted under the proce-
dural due process requirement.
Section 7 (a), at first appearance, would seem to include immi-
gration inspectors provided for in Section 16 of the Immigration
Act. Senator McCarran, in commenting on Section 7(a), stated,
".. . the connittee desires that Government agencies should be
put on notice that the provision in question is not intended to
permit agencies to avoid the use of examiners, but only to pre-
serve special statutory types of hearing officers who contribute
something more than examiners could contribute, and at the same
time to assure the parties fair and impartial procedure." S. Doc.
No. 248, supra, at 325.
The question then turned on an interpretation of Section 16,
and the decision was that immigration inspectors conducting de-
portation hearings were not specifically provided for in Section
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16. That this was the basis of the decision was pointed out in
United States ex rel. Frisch v. Miller, 18 U.S.L. W=.x 2466 (1950),
decided subsequent to the principal case. There it was held that
Section 7 (a) excluded alien exclusion proceedings before a special
board of inquiry provided for in Section 17 of the Immigration Act.
In view of the long history of the APA, the great desire and
the stated necessity of separating the adjudicating functions, the
court in the instant case followed the stated intent of the framers
of the Act. To have held otherwise would have allowed Section
7 (a) to have become the loophole for avoidance of the examiner
system which the legislators warned against. The decision retains
the uniformity of procedure and the separation of functions which
the Act was framed to accomplish.
"The immediate effect of the . . . decision was to bring into
question the validity of certain other hearings in deportation pro-
ceedings in which the subject alien has not been deported." Jef-
ferys, The Wong Yang Sung Decision, ImmGRATION AND NATuRA-
ZATION SERVICE MoNTHLy REvIEw, April, 1950, p. 131, 137. The
number of cases decided since September, 1946, and thereby af-
fected, was found to be 10,000. NEwSWEEK, March 6, 1950, p. 18,
19.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service has adjusted its
regulations to conform to the APA, with Hearing Examiners ap-
pointed under Section 11. 15 FED. REG. 1297-1302; 18 U.S.L. WEEK
2405 (1950).
Several bill were introduced in the last two sessions of
Congress attempting to exempt the Immigration Service from the
APA, but Congress adjourned without taking action.
Thus the battle rages in the administrative branch of govern-
ment, the battle which dates from 1610 when Coke, in Dr. Bon-
ham's Case, said, "one cannot be Judge and attorney for any of
the parties." 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652.
Richard E. Bridwell
PROCEDURE--SUIT TO COMPEL DECLARATION or DmDENDs-
JOINDER OF PARTIES
Defendant corporation is a citizen of Delaware doing business
in Pennsylvania. It had outstanding 100,000 shares of $6 cumu-
lative preferred no-par stock, 120 of which were held by plaintiff,
a citizen of New York. Also outstanding were 456,576 shares of
no-par common stock, 92% of which were held by four large
users of defendant's products. Defendant defaulted on dividend
payments for several consecutive periods, until dividend arrearages
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on the preferred shares amounted to $57.75 per share. Plaintiff
then brought action to compel the declaration of dividends. In
his complaint plaintiff alleged and offered to prove that defendant's
financial condition would easily permit the payment of dividends,
and he further alleged that the directors of the corporation were
"unreasonable and arbitrary" in that they were expanding pro-
duction facilities in order to benefit the four large customer-
stockholders. At the commencement of the action plaintiff served
the corporation but not the individual directors. The trial court
held that a majority of the board of directors must be served, and
granted defendant's motion to dismiss. Only three out of a total
of twelve could be served in Pennsylvania, and in no other single
jurisdiction could a majority be served. Held, on appeal, that
the directors are not necessary parties. Kroese v. General Steel
Castings Corporation et al, 179 F. 2d 760 (C.A. 3rd 1950); certio-
rar denied, 339 U.S. 983 (1950).
A failure to pay dividends when due, even those on preferred
shares, is not an uncommon occurrence in the financial world.
Aside from the most obvious precluding factor, that of insufficient
surplus out of which dividends can be paid, there is an added
reason why the stockholder may not realize any income from his
investment in a corporation. This is the fact that the declaration
of dividends is, wvith very few exceptions, a function of the board
of directors, and whether or not they are declared is a matter
within the board's discretion. 1935 DEL. REV. CODE Section 2066;
Oiuo GEN. CODE Sections 8623-38 and 8623-55; Jones v. Van Heu-
sen Charles Co., 230 App. Div. 694, 246 N.Y.S. 204 (1930); Hastings
v. Intermtional Paper Co., 187 App. Div. 404, 175 N.Y.S. 815 (1919).
Prior to this declaration of dividends by the board of directors, the
individual stockholder has no legal right in the surplus of the cor-
poration. In re Goetz's Estate, 236 Pa. 630, 85 A. 65 (1912). Thus,
so long as the power of discretion is wielded in good faith, the fact
that the directors have decided upon another legitimate use for an
existing surplus should not give rise to judicial intervention. 1
MovAtwEz, PRivATE CORPORATIONS (2nd Ed. 1886) Section 460.
However, if the failure to pay dividends, assuming sufficient
surplus, is part of a general scheme to defraud the stockholder,
or if there is any bad faith or arbitrary use of the power of dis-
cretion, it is well settled that a stockholder may invoke the aid of
equity in a suit to compel the declaration of dividends. Dodge v.
Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919); Barclay v.
Wabash Railway Co., 30 F. 2d 260 (C.C.A. 2d 1929); Mitchell
v. Des Moines and F. D. R. Co., 270 F. 465 (C.C.A. 2d 1920);
Kassel v. Empire Tinware Co., 178 App. Div. 176, 164 N.Y.S. 1033
(1917); Jones v. Van Heusen Charles Co., supra. In the Dodge
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case supra, the court went so far as to order that a common
stock dividend of a specified amount be declared. Whether or
not a court goes too far when it actually determines the amount
of the dividend is a serious question, but one that is not presented
by the instant case because it is an action on preferred stock with
a dividend rate of $6 per share.
The court of equity, acting in personam, cannot invade the
province of the directors by actually declaring a dividend. The
judgment of the court must take the form of a mandatory injunc-
tion, ordering that a dividend be declared. Kales v. Woodworth,
32 F. 2d 37 (C.C.A. 6th 1929). It still remains the function of
the board, therefore, to meet and go through the motions of a
formal declaration in compliance with the decree of the court,
and also to satisfy the statutory requirement of most states that a
dividend must be voted upon and passed by the directors. For
this reason the courts, prior to the instant case, have consistently
enunciated the rule that there must be personal jurisdiction over
at least a majority of the directors, in addition to jurisdiction over
the corporation. Gesell v. Tomahawk Land Co., 184 Wis. 537,
200 N.W. 550 (1924); Schuckman v. Rubenstein, 164 F. 2d 952
(C.C.A. 6th 1947); Jones v. Van Heusen Charles Co., supra. In
the opinion of these courts, there was no other method by which
the directors could be forced to "exercise their discretion" by
declaring a dividend by the required number of votes. Schuck-
man v. Rubenstein, supra. The problem then would seem to be
one of enforcement only.
In the opinion of Judge Goodrich the question of how to make
the decree effective is not a difficult one to answer. He said: "To
doubt its -effectiveness is to doubt the power of a court of equity
wielded by a chancellor with legal imagination." Kroese v. Gen-
eral Steel Castings Corporation et al, supra, p. 764. The case holds
that so long as the court has jurisdiction over the corporation and
its property lying within the state the decree of the court becomes
the controlling factor. The corporation is no longer guided by the
discretion of its directors but is instead bound by the court's in-
junction. It continues to be subject to the power of the court even
though the directors fail to comply with the order. The court points
out the fact that a creditor of a corporation does not need a meeting
of the board of directors to make his judgment valid. Even though
in the present type of case the directors must still perform the
ministerial function of making a formal declaration for the sake of
the records and to satisfy the statutory requirements, their failure
to do so would certainly not vitiate the court's power over the
corporation. Since the corporation is so affected by the decree,
what is to prevent the court from using enforcement procedure
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against the corporation itself, even though jurisdiction over the
directors is lacking? The court suggests that sequestration of the
corporation's property lying within the jurisdiction should prove
to be a very effective means of coercion. Continental Mortgage
Guarantee Co. v. Whitecourt Construction Corp., 164 Misc. 56, 297
N. Y. S. 338 (1937). It would seem that as to the directors of a
corporation this method of enforcement should be just as compel-
ling as any that could be used by a court with personal jurisdiction.
The court in the instant case recognized the Schuckman case,
supra, as a contrary holding by another federal court, but an at-
tempt was made to distinguish the two cases on the basis of a dif-
ference between the statutes of Delaware and those of Ohio. 1935
DEL. REV. CODE Sections 2041 and 2066, and OHIo GEN. CODE Sec-
tions 8623-38 and 8623-55. These sections, aside from specifying
the funds out of which dividends may be paid, also provide that
if dividends are declared the declaration shall be made by the
board of directors. It is a matter of discretion with the board in
either case and it is difficult to see wherein the statutes differ
in their application to the present problem. It would seem, there-
fore, that the two cases are definitely in conflict and that a choice
will have to be made between the two opposite holdings. The
denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court adds some weight to
the instant case but leaves the matter still unsettled.
It would appear that the decision in the present case is to be
preferred over those of the older cases. The rule so consistently
adhered to in the past placed too great a burden on the stockholder
with an otherwise justiciable case. It is common knowledge that
the large corporations of today may be governed by directors who
are citizens of widely scattered jurisdictions. To serve a majority
may often be an impossibility, and to leave the stockholder without
a remedy would be inequitable. It is true that hard cases should
not make bad law, but the rule of the instant case should not be
labeled as such. Although sequestration was never before used in
this field, it is certainly not a device that is unknown to courts of
equity. 2 DAN7mL, CHANCERY PRACTICE 690 (Am. Ed. 1846). There
would seem to be no hardship inflicted upon the corporation by
the rule of this case, other than to make it amenable to suits by
persons with legitimate causes of action.
Frank E. Kane
TORTs-LABELING A MAN A COMMUNIST-LIBEL PER SE
Plaintiff, Ward in his petition stated, inter alia, that he is
a member of the American Federation of Labor. That he earns
his livelihood from his employment as Secretary of the Painters
District Council No. 6 in the city of Cleveland and that said posi-
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tion is subject to election by the free and popular vote of the
members of the Painters Union. That defendant, League for Jus-
tice, under the direction of defendant, John P. Moran, caused
to be published a pamphlet entitled, "League For Justice Informa-
tion For Americans", in which the plaintiff was depicted as one
of the most active and treacherous Communists in Ohio and further
charging, that he was affiliated with Russian Communism and had
performed various acts as a tool for Stalin in the furtherance of
his objectives. Plaintiff made no averment of special damage.
Defendants filed a general demurrer which was sustained by the
Court of Common Please of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, on the ground
that the words published were not libelous per se, and there being
no averment of special damage an action in libel was not main-
tainable. Held, reversed on appeal to the court of appeals. The
appellate court holding that it is libelous per se to write of a man
as a Communist, that label tending to taint him as a man of dis-
repute. Ward v. League for Justice et al, 57 Ohio L. Abs. 197 (1950).
Early in the common law both written and oral defamation
were included under slander. Later in 1690 libel was recognized
as a separate branch of the law of defamation. Slander, in modern
usage, has been limited to defamation by words spoken, and in
this sense may be defined as the speaking of base and defamatory
words which tend to the prejudice of the reputation, office, trade,
business, or means of getting a living of another. 53 C.J.S. Libel
& Slander, § 1, b, p. 33. Libel is broader than slander and em-
braces many things affecting reputation which are not slanderous
when spoken. Libel is frequently defined as a malicious publica-
tion, expressed either in printing or writing, or by signs and pic-
tures, tending either to blacken the memory of one dead or the
reputation of one who is alive, and expose him to public hatred,
contempt or ridicule. 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander, § 1, p. 31. From
its inception libel has been considered written defamation and has
been treated as a more serious wrong because of permanence of
form or potentiality of harm.
In the law of defamation the words per se were first used to
designate those slanderous words which would be actionable
without proof of special damages, namely: the imputation of seri-
ous crime, the imputation of certain loathsome diseases, and im-
putations affecting the plaintiff in his business, trade, profession
or office. All other unprivileged, slanderous words were action-
able upon proof of special damages. 8 MoNT. L. REV. 76, 78 (1947).
However, at early common law any libel, as opposed to slander,
was actionable without allegation and proof of special damage.
Hughes v. Samuels Bros., 179 Iowa 1077, 159 N.W. 589 (1916);
Sydney v. MacFadden Newspaper Pub. Carm.. 242 N.Y. 208, 151
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N.E. 209 (1926); see NEwmL, SLA=ER AN LmE § 775 (4th ed.
1924).
Today, the words per se and per quod are being applied to
libel law by many courts and the distinction is expressed in two
forms. Some courts make the differentiation on the basis of evi-
dence and define libel per se as words defamatory on their face
while libel per quod is said to be words defamatory only in the
light of extrinsic circumstances. Others distinguish the two on
the basis of pleading and hold that words libelous per se do not
require allegation and proof of special damage, while those libel-
ous per quod do require such allegation and proof. PossER,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 790, § 91 (1941); HARPER, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTs 518, 519, § 243 (1940). In the
majority of jurisdictions, however, any libel is still actionable
per se, irrespective of whether any special harm has been caused
to the plaintiff's reputation. PossER, TonTs 797 (1941); RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS § 569, comment c (1938).
Many criteria exist for determining what libelous words fall
into the category of libel per se. As a general rule words, written
or printed, are libelous per se if they tend to expose a person to
public hatred, contempt, ridicule, aversion, or disgrace, induce an
evil opinion of him in the minds of right thinking persons, and
deprive him of their friendly intercourse and society. 53 C.J.S.
Libel and Slander, § 13, p. 57.
Courts have long held that a political epithet might tend to
defame. In 1889 it was libelous per se to write of a man as an
anarchist. Cerveny v. Chicago Daily News, 139 Ill. 345, 28 N.E.
692 (1891). To write of one as a socialist was considered libelous
per se in 1915. Ogren v. Rockford Star, 288 IlM. 405, 123 N.E. 587
(1919). Similarly in 1926 it was libelous per se to write of a
man as a "red." Toomey v. Jones, 124 Okla. 167, 254 Pac. 736
(1926). When these cases were decided such affiliations were
considered contemptible in that they advocated lawless methods
in sabotaging and attempting to overthrow the American political
and economic system. Likewise, the term "Nazi" or "Fascist"
before or during World War H was held to be libelous per se since
anyone characterized as such suffered immediate loss of reputa-
tion and prestige, with exposure to hate and possible violence.
Derounian v. Stokes, 168 F. 2d 305 (C.C.A. 10th 1948); Levy v.
Gelber, 175 Misc. 746, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 148 (1941); Devany v. Quill,
187 Misc. 698, 64 N.Y.S. 733 (1946); Luotto v. Field, 49 N.Y.S. 2d
785 (1944).
In 1929, the first case appeared indicating that labeling a
man a Communist might be libel. Hays v. American Defense So-
ciety, 252 N.Y. 266, 169 N.E. 380 (1929). In 1939, a lower New
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York court held that charging a man with being a Communist
would not support an action in libel. Garriga v. Richfield, 174
Misc. 315, 20 N.Y.S. 2d 544 (1940). Russian-United States rela-
tions had improved in the interim. In 1941, another New York
lower court refused to follow the Garriga decision. Levy v. Gelber,
175 Misc. 746, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 178 (1941). At this time the German-
Russian Pact of August, 1939 was in effect. A little later in 1942,
a New York court in Boudin v. Tishman, 264 App. Div. 842, 35
N.Y.S. 2d 760 (1942), adopted the view of Levy v. Gelber and is
now generally considered the law in New York on the subject.
Elsewhere, in other jurisdictions, because of the obloquy
and reproach connected with such affiliations, it has almost con-
sistently been held to be actionable in libel or slander to charge
a person with being a Communist. Whether or not it is libelous
per se is determined by the effect of the word "Communist" upon
the ordinary person of average intelligence in the light of the
then public attitude toward Communism. See Note, 171 A.L.R.
709. In sounding this public opinion the courts have looked to
polls, studies and legislation relevant to Communism. In a For-
tune survey, Fortune, February, 1940, p. 136, of these disposed
to curtail free speech, approximately 40% would prohibit Com-
munism as a subject and Communists as speakers. Exec. Order
No. 1835, Part V, § 1, 12 FED. REG. 1938 (1947) outlined a pro-
cedure for the discharge of those employees as to whom reasonable
grounds exist for the belief that the person involved is disloyal to
the government. For a list of others see 24 NOTRE DAmE LAw.
544 (1949), notes 11 and 12; 32 Mlnw. L. REv. 413 (1947), notes
6, 7, 8 and 9. The recent "Communist Control Bill" will also aid
in pointing up the public attitude toward Communism. Pub. L.
No. 831, Internal Security Act 1950. There are those who believe
that under the theory of the prosecution in the recent trial of
eleven Communist leaders and as a result of conviction in that
case, membership in the Communist Party is now a crime. 50
COL. L. REv. 526, 528 (1950). Notwithstanding the above, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court very recently held that to call a
man a Communist is not libel per se. McAndrew v. Scranton Re-
publican Publishing Co., 364 Pa. 504, 72 A. 2d 180 (1950). This
decision, however, was based on dictionary and logical connota-
tions of Communism and did not take into account the existing
social norms and antipathies in ascertaining whether a falsification
has the capacity to bring another into disrepute. 98 U. PA. L. REv.
931 (1950).
In the instant Ohio case, the court of appeals relied consider-
ably upon State v. Smily, 37 Ohio St. 30 (1881), which stated that
although the matter published might not, without averment and
proof of special damage, be actionable, if only spoken, yet if pub-
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lished, and it be of a character, which, if believed, would naturally
tend to expose the person concerning whom the same was pub-
lished, to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or deprive him of
the benefits of public confidence or social intercourse such pub-
lication is a libel, and an action will lie therefor although no special
damage is alleged. The court then passed to a consideration of
cases from other jurisdictions, some of which have already been
mentioned, and concluded that the publication concerning plain-
tiff, Ward, if believed, would naturally tend to expose him to
public hatred, contempt and ridicule, and deprive him of the
benefit of public confidence and social intercourse, and such pub-
lication is therefore libelous per se and an action will lie therefor
although no special damage is alleged.
Defendant gave notice of appeal, but although the Ohio State
Supreme Court had not passed upon the question of calling a man
a communist as libelous per se, it did, on October 18, 1950, overrule
defendant's motion to certify the record, and in effect, upheld the
decision of the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County. Notwith-
standing the fact that the case law in Ohio is somewhat precarious
relevant to this question, it is submitted that had the court passed
directly upon the matter, it would have had little difficulty in
rationalizing its present position. A consideration of some of the
Ohio cases will tend to indicate the pattern that has been develop-
ing in Ohio with respect to libelous statements.
In an action for libel the question whether the publication is
or is not libelous per se is a question for the court. Mark v. Brund-
age et al, 68 Ohio St. 89 (1903). "Libelous per se" embraces
words of three classes: imputing an indictable offense involving
moral turpitude or infamous punishment; imputing a contagious
or offensive disease or condition tending to ostracize; or tending
to injure one in one's occupation. Hunt v. Meridian Printing Co.,
320 Ohio C. D. 151, 17 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. (N.S.) 293 (1910). To be
libelous per se the publication must reflect upon the character of
a person by bringing him into ridicule, hatred or contempt, or
affect him injuriously in his trade or profession. Cleveland Leader
Printing Co. v. Nethersole, 89 Ohio St. 118, 95 N.E. 735 (1911).
More recently, a publication which charges one with utterances
that bring him into contempt, ridicule or hatred, is not actionable
without alleging special damages, unless it liberally and not tech-
nicalIy construed charges utterances which are a violation of the
laws of the land or of good morals. Sweeney v. Beacon Journal
Pub. Co., 66 Ohio App. 475, 35 N.E. 2d 471 (1941). Later in West-
ropp v. E. W. Scripps Co., 148 Ohio St. 365, 74 N.E. 2d 340 (1947),
the court quoted with approval 1 CooLEY, TORTS (4th Ed.) 491, §
145, words to the effect that any false and malicious writing pub-
Iished of another is libelous per se when its tendency is to render
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him contemptible or ridiculous in public estimation, or expose him
to public hatred. Also on page 501 of the same authority, that "in
determining whether the words charged are libelous per se, they
are to be taken in their plain and natural import according to the
ideas they are calculated to convey to those to whom they are
addressed, reference being had not only to the words themselves,
but also to the circumstances under which they were used." Fur-
ther insight into the Ohio pattern may be obtained through a
study of still more recent decisions. Writing of a man as a Com-
munist is libelous per se and special damages need not be alleged.
Burrell v. Moran, 52 Ohio L. Abs. 465, 82 N.E. 2d 334 (1948). It
is not a crime in Ohio to be a member of the Communist Party.
Fawick Airflex v. United Electrical Workers et, Kres., 56 Ohio
L. Abs. 432 (1950). And finally, courts now take judicial notice
that whoever is a Communist is by reason of that fact a member
of an organization the international purpose of which is to destroy
the Government of the United States. Dwrken v. Board of Edu-
cation (Cleveland), 57 Ohio L. Abs. 449 (1950).
Some of the above holdings seem to indicate that there is
a tendency to harmonize libel per se with slander per se. Be that
as it may, the definition of libel per se adopted by the supreme
court in the Westropp case seems to be broad enough to include
the label "Communist" imputed to a plaintiff. Likewise, if damage
to character, violation of law or morality is to form the test, the
growing willingness to recognize communistic affiliation as synony-
mous with governmental overthrow would seem to satisfy these
criteria.
The major obstacles which deter the holding that calling a
man a Communist is libel per se have been overcome by most
courts. The fact that the Communists may function as a legally
recognized party is immaterial. 32 IV~mN. L. REV. 412, 414 (1947).
Illegality of the act charged is not a requisite of libel. Stevens v.
Snow, 191 Cal. 58, 62, 214 Pac. 968, 969 (1923). That the word
"Communist" has no definite meaning is untenable. 22 N.Y.U.L.Q.
Rav. 513, 516 (1947).
Another difficult question is the one of policy. Can we expect
a greater net gain by protecting reputations of individuals at the
expense of making it more difficult to detect subversive communist
elements, than would result if we relaxed the enforcement of the
law of libel per se with respect to a charge of Communism and
thereby make it easier to expose these groups and individuals?
Also in our political make-up there are left-wing liberals who are
not Communists but who stand to have their reputations ruined
by being portrayed as such. Their protection negatives any re-
laxation in the enforcement of the rule of libel per se when applied
to the Communist epithet.
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The Ohio Supreme Court's refusal to review Ward v. League
for Justice constitutes a revelation of Ohio's judicial attitude on
this current policy question. Ohio has recognized that in the
present era a Communist label can ruin a reputation, ostracize
one from society, and in some cases lead to the individual's physical
abuse. However, as times change, relationships vary, and words
take on new meanings. Only the future can disclose when the
Communist label will be shorn of its ephemeral capacity to damage
a reputation and thence be relegated to the habitude of words of
libelous impotency.
Cornelius W. Dillon

